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[533] 
Comparative Cruelty: A Comparative 
Analysis of the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Section Nine 
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act  
 
by CARRIE LEONETTI* 
 





A death-row prisoner spends their last twenty-four hours in a special 
holding cell just feet from the death chamber.  The hours comprise a flurry 
of phone calls and legal visits, emergency stays granted and lifted, requests 
for clemency and extraordinary judicial intervention denied, a last meal that 
is hardly actually eaten, followed by the long walk (or violent drag) to the 
chamber where inmates are strapped down, given last words, and executed, 
usually by a three-drug injection cocktail known to cause paralysis and 
searing pain before the third drug causes death.  In other words, the death 
penalty is a barbaric practice that seems out of place in the modern world.  
Internationally, it has been mostly abolished for this reason, but several 
countries have held out against this trend. 
Proportionality is an ancient concept in the criminal law.  It played a 
central role in Montesquieu’s Sprit of the Laws1 and Beccaria’s On Crimes 
and Punishments.2  In keeping with this foundational concept of 
proportionality, most democratic countries have similar constitutional 
 
 * Associate Professor, University of Auckland School of Law.  Grateful thanks to Sascha 
Mueller, Robin Palmer, Jan Jakob Bornheim, and the rest of the law faculty at the University of 
Canterbury for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.  Any mistakes were almost 
certainly made by ignoring their advice. 
 1.  See CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (1748). 
 2.  See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (1764). 
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prohibitions against cruel treatment and disproportionate3 punishment.4  
Nonetheless, in interpreting these prohibitions, countries’ constitutional and 
human rights traditions have developed different definitions of “cruel” and 
“excessive,” particularly in the application of the prohibition to specific 
penal practices. 
Within this international context of the constitutional regulation of the 
excessiveness of criminal punishments, the ongoing robustness of the death 
penalty in the United States stands out in stark contrast to the trend 
throughout most of the rest of the world, in which the imposition of capital 
punishment is largely viewed as inconsistent with international human-rights 
norms.5  This Article attempts to contribute to the ongoing effort by human 
rights scholars to wrestle with the mystery of the survival of this gruesome 
practice in the United States by analyzing it through a comparative lens. 
Specifically, this Article explores the commonalities and differences 
between the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in 
 
 3.  This Article uses “excessive” and “disproportionate” interchangeably, and 
“constitutional” in its broadest and most generic sense.  
 4.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human 
Rights also prohibit torture and inhuman or degrading treatment.  See European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”), art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 222, CETS No. 5 (1953); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 5 (1948); 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp No 13, 
UN Doc A/810, art. 5 (1948).  The Canadian Charter of Rights prohibits cruel and unusual treatment 
or punishment.  See Canadian Charter of Rights, § 12 (1982) Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, Part I of Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, 
c. 12. 
 5.  See Capital Punishment and Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection 
of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. 
E/2000/3 (2000) (documenting the international trend toward abolition of the death penalty); see, 
e.g., Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, ETS No. 114, (Mar. 30, 1985); Protocol 
to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, OASTS No. 73, 29 
ILM 1447 (1990) (entered into force Oct. 6, 1993); Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, art. 19(2) (Dec. 18, 2000) (prohibiting the extradition of suspects to 
countries where there is a serious risk of facing the death penalty); The Question of the Death 
Penalty, Human Rights Comm’n Rights Res. 1999/61 (Apr. 28, 1999), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/ 
RES/1999/61; Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) (holding that the 
extradition of Soering from the United Kingdom to the United States for a capital offense, without 
assurances that the United States would not impose the death penalty, violated Article 3 of the 
ECHR because “death row phenomenon”—the psychological torture of prolonged detention while 
awaiting execution—constituted inhuman and degrading treatment); Pratt v. Attorney General for 
Jamaica, [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C. 1993), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 364 (1994) (holding that the imposition 
of the death penalty more than five years after pronouncement of the sentence categorically 
constituted inhuman and degrading punishment); United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 
(Canada) (holding that the extradition of two defendants to the United States to stand trial for capital 
murder, in the absence of assurances that the death penalty would not be inflicted, violated the right 
to life guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms); Venezia v. Italy, App. No. 
29966/96, 87-A Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 140 (1996) (holding that prolonged detention prior 
to execution violated fundamental human rights). 
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the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the prohibition 
against cruel, degrading, and inhumane treatment and excessive punishment 
contained in Section 9 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(“BoRA”).6  The Article focuses on the United States and New Zealand 
because the text and historical English common law context of the Eighth 
 
 6.  New Zealand, like the United Kingdom, lacks a unitary, express, written constitution.  
See generally Philip A. Joseph, The Constitutional State, in LAW, LIBERTY, LEGISLATION: ESSAYS 
IN HONOUR OF JOHN BURROWS Q.C. 249 (Jeremy Finn et al. eds., 2008); Beverley McLachlin, 
Unwritten Constitutional Principles: What is Going On?, 4 N.Z. J. PUB. INTL. L. 147 (2006); 
Matthew S.R. Palmer, What is New Zealand’s Constitution and Who Interprets it? Constitutional 
Realism and the Importance of Public Office-Holders, 17 PUB. L. REV. 133 (2006).  The rights of 
a constitutional character are instead protected in New Zealand by a collection of statutes.  See, 
e.g., Constitution Act 1986 (N.Z.) (establishing the authority of the Queen and the three branches 
of the New Zealand Government, the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary); Electoral Act 
1993 (N.Z.) (establishing the basis of voting); Human Rights Act 1993 (N.Z.) (prohibiting 
discrimination); Imperial Laws Application Act 1988 (N.Z.) (providing for the continued 
enforcement the parts of the English common law already incorporated in New Zealand and certain 
imperial enactments, including the Magna Carta and the Petition of Right); Privacy Act 1993 
(N.Z.); Supreme Court Act 2003 (N.Z.); see also Treaty of Waitangi Between Maori Chiefs of New 
Zealand and the British Crown [1840] N.Z.T.S. (establishing the founding principles for the 
Government, citizenship, and property rights during the annexation of New Zealand by Great 
Britain); New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General, [2013] NZSC 6; (“the Water Rights 
Case”); Huakina Dvpt. Trust v. Waikato Valley Auth., [1987] 2 NZLR 188 (HC); Catherine 
Callaghan, “Constitutionalisation” of Treaties by the Courts - The Treaty of Waitangi and The 
Treaty of Rome Compared, 18 N.Z.U. L. REV. 334 (1999); Bruce V. Harris, The Treaty of Waitangi 
and the Constitutional Future of New Zealand, [2005] N.Z. L. REV. 189, most notably by BoRA, 
which codifies protected individual rights and freedoms in New Zealand—and customary 
conventions, which together form a model of entrenched constitutionalism.  See PHILIP A. JOSEPH, 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 34 (4th ed. 2014) (describing 
New Zealand’s constitutional conventions as “the pre-eminent non-legal source of the 
Constitution”); Mark Elliott, Interpretive Bills of Rights and the Mystery of the Unwritten 
Constitution, 2011 NZLR 591; see generally GEOFFREY MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTIONS: THE RULES AND FORMS OF POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY (1984).  New Zealand is 
also a signatory to several international treaties, which guarantee rights that are constitutional in 
nature.  See, e.g., the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), 99 U.N.T.S. 
171 (1976).  Because BoRA is a statute and not a formal, supreme constitution, it does not supersede 
other legislation that may conflict with it.  See BoRA § 4 (requiring New Zealand courts to give 
effect to legislation that cannot be interpreted to conform with BoRA); see generally PAUL 
RISHWORTH ET AL., THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT (2003); Elliott, supra, at 593-94.  
Although the courts in New Zealand will engage in a saving construction of any legislation alleged 
to infringe on a protected right in order to avoid a conflict with BoRA, see BoRA § 6 (obligating 
courts to interpret other statutes consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in BoRA 
whenever possible), they can (but, rarely do) provide advisory opinions for the benefit of Parliament 
if they believe that a statute unjustifiably infringes on a right protected by BoRA.  See, e.g., Hanson 
v. R., [2007] NZSC 7 at  253-54 (McGrath, J.) (explaining that “a New Zealand court must never 
shirk its responsibility to indicate, in any case where it concludes that the measure being considered 
is inconsistent with protected rights, that . . . there is a measure on the statute book which infringes 
protected rights and freedoms”).  But see Manawatu v. R., [2007] NZSC 13 at 6 (finding that the 
Court had no jurisdiction to hear a BoRA claim “to interpret the legislation in a way that would be 
more consistent with rights protected by the Bill of Rights”). 
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Amendment and BoRA Section 9 are very similar.7  However, the two 
countries’ judicial interpretations of the provisions are quite divergent, 
particularly when applied to cases in which prisoners have challenged their 
criminal punishments.  These differences are most notable when courts in 
the two countries apply the cruelty prohibitions to long sentences of 
imprisonment and the practice of capital punishment. 
In contrast to much of the normative American scholarly literature on 
comparative constitutionalism,8 this Article is a descriptive one.  It offers a 
comparative analysis of the judicial interpretations of the meanings of 
“cruel” and “excessive” in the United States and New Zealand.  It treats New 
Zealand as a lens through which to view Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
and American constitutional values,9 but it does not make a normative 
argument about which interpretive culture is superior.  The purpose of this 
comparison is to demonstrate the way that similar constitutional prohibitions 
can operate radically differently in different philosophical and legal cultures. 
This Article uses New Zealand as a comparator for the United States 
for several reasons.  First, the United States and New Zealand have similar 
legal traditions with a shared historical constitutional pedigree.10  Second, 
the United States and New Zealand both have dualist systems when it comes 
to their obligations under the international treaties to which they are 
signatories—i.e., international treaty obligations only become binding and 
legally enforceable in each country when their national legislatures have 
codified them by statute.11  Third, the United States and New Zealand, both 
culturally and legally, are at opposite ends of the international spectrum 
when it comes to their cultural and constitutional views about the death 
penalty.  Most importantly, the United States remains the only democracy 
and signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
 7.  See David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 
539, 559-60 (2001) (explaining why constitutional comparison is most desirable when the two 
countries whose constitutions are being compared share the greatest contextual similarities in terms 
of legal systems, legal history, and social situation); see also Knight v. Florida, cert. denied, 529 
U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining the usefulness of comparing the Eighth 
Amendment to analogous provisions of the constitutions of other “former Commonwealth nations” 
because they reflected the same underlying “legal tradition”). 
 8.  See, e.g., Fontana, supra note 7. 
 9.  See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE 
HUMAN SCIENCES 16-25 (1970) (explaining how comparative legal methodology can give rise to 
a recognition of universal principles). 
 10.  Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (attempting to 
understand the scope of the right to privacy in relation to Connecticut’s criminal prohibition against 
the use of contraceptives by looking to “common understanding throughout the English-speaking 
world”). 
 11.  See infra Section II (A) (3). 
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(“ICCPR”) with a robust practice of capital punishment.12  Distinguishably, 
New Zealand categorically abolished its death penalty in 1989 and was the 
first country in the world to sign the Optional Second Protocol to the ICCPR 
(“Death Penalty Protocol”), which commits to the abolition of the death 
penalty worldwide.13 
Section II of this Article explores the shared historical underpinnings of 
the two countries’ respective prohibitions against cruelty and excessiveness.  
Section III describes the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, and Section 9 
of BoRA, which prohibits torture, cruelty, degradation, and excessive 
punishment.  It then engages in a comparison of the texts, interpretations, 
and judicial applications of the two analogous provisions.  It demonstrates 
that the texts of the two provisions have been interpreted to encompass 
similar prohibitions in theory, but, in practice, judicial application of the 
provisions to specific situations—most notably challenges to the 
excessiveness of criminal punishments—has been vastly different in the two 
countries. 
Section IV specifically explores the application of the prohibitions 
against cruelty to the practice of the death penalty, which has been abolished 
in New Zealand but continues to thrive in the United States: the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 
notwithstanding.  This section posits that the different judicial applications 
of the Eighth Amendment and Section 9 of BoRA stem from philosophically 
different understandings of the values that guide proportionality balancing.  
It concludes that the difference between the American courts’ constitutional 
tolerance of the death penalty and the New Zealand courts’ rejection of it, 
stem from retributive versus utilitarian understandings of the purposes of 
capital punishment as balanced against the means by which those purposes 
are accomplished. 
Section V addresses an obvious methodological limitation to this 
comparative analysis.  Because New Zealand has legislatively abolished the 
death penalty, its courts’ contemporary discussions of the relationship 
between capital punishment and domestic and international prohibitions 
 
 12.  While many countries still retain a de jure death penalty on the books of their criminal 
codes, few still actually impose the punishment in practice.  See Amrita Mukherjee, The ICCPR as 
a Living Instrument: The Death Penalty as Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment, 68 J. CRIM. 
L. 507 (2004).  While death sentences and executions have decreased in the United States in recent 
years, they are still far from rare. 
 13.  Greg Newbold, Capital Punishment in New Zealand: An Experiment That Failed, 11 
DEVIANT BEHAV. 155, 156 (1990); see generally Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Aiming 
at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, U.N. G.A. Res. No. 44/128 (Dec. 15, 1989) (entered into 
force July 11, 1991) [hereinafter “Second Protocol”], art. 1 (“1. No one within the jurisdiction of a 
State Party to the present Protocol shall be executed.  2. Each State Party shall take all necessary 
measures to abolish the death penalty within its jurisdiction.”). 
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against excessive punishment are necessarily sparse.  Section VI concludes 
that the divergence in interpretations between the Eighth Amendment and 
Section 9 stem from judicial philosophy and culture, rather than text, history, 
or doctrine. 
I. Geneological Comparison14 
 
A. The Commonalities 
 
1. Shared English Legal History 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 
9 of BoRA share a common cultural and legal heritage.  The Magna Carta 
included a prohibition against excessive fines, which British courts 
interpreted very early on as a broad proportionality principle that invalidated 
disproportionate punishments.15  In 1688, the British Parliament enacted the 
first statutory right to be free from cruel punishments in the English Bill of 
Rights Act.16  This statute was the basis for the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, which imports it nearly verbatim.17 
When New Zealand was annexed by Great Britain in 1840, it inherited 
most of its common and statutory law.18  In 1988, the New Zealand 
Parliament specifically incorporated the prohibition against cruelty into New 
Zealand statutory law, through the Imperial Laws Application Act.19 
 
2. The ICCPR 
Both New Zealand and the United States are State Parties to the 
ICCPR.20  The ICCPR is part of the International Bill of Human Rights.21  
Article 6 of the ICCPR establishes a general right to life, but contains an 
 
 14.  Fontana, supra note 7, at 550. 
 15.  See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983); see, e.g., Hodges v. Humkin, 80 Eng. Rep. 
1015, 1016 (K.B. 1615) (Croke, J.) (“[I]mprisonment ought always to be according to the quality 
of the offence[.]”). 
 16.  Bill of Rights Act 1688 (U.K.), art. 10 (“[E]xcessive bail ought not to be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed[;] nor cruel and unusual Punishments inflicted.”). 
 17.  See Helm, 463 U.S. at 285; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976); in re: Kemmler, 
136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890) (“The provision in reference to cruel and unusual punishments was taken 
from the well-known act of Parliament of 1688, entitled ‘An act for declaring the rights and liberties 
of the subject, and settling the succession of the crown[.]’”); United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 
1139, 1235 n.160 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wright, C.J., dissenting); see generally JOHN D. BESSLER, 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE FOUNDERS’ EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT 162-80 (2012); Amy L. Riederer, Working 9 to 5: Embracing the Eighth Amendment 
through an Integrated Model of Prison Labor, 43 VALPARAISO L. REV. 1425, 1429 (2009). 
 18.  See Newbold, supra note 12, at 156-57. 
 19.  Imperial Laws Application Act 1988, s 3 (N.Z.), § 3 (“Excessive bail ought not to be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 20.  ICCPR, supra note 6. 
 21.  Mukherjee, supra note 11, at 510. 
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exception for capital punishment as a lawful sanction for serious crimes if it 
is administered in a manner that minimizes the pain and suffering of the 
condemned person.22  Article 7 of the ICCPR prohibits “torture” or “cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”23  Section 9 of BoRA is 
derived from Article 7 of the ICCPR. 
As noted above, New Zealand has also specifically ratified the ICCPR 
Death Penalty Protocol.24  The United States, predictably, has not.25 
 
3. The Role of Comparative Constitutionalism 
 
Courts in New Zealand and the United States take similar approaches 
to interpreting domestic rights in relation to these international treaty 
obligations, as well as in relation to foreign constitutions.  In interpreting 
both the provisions of the United States Constitution and BoRA for which 
there are analogous provisions in international human-rights treaties or 
foreign constitutions, courts in both countries do not consider external 
interpretations of those analogous provisions to be binding on them in 
interpreting their corresponding domestic rights guarantees, but both 
consider them to be persuasive;26 although those interpretations carry 
significantly more persuasive weight in New Zealand.27 
 
 22.  ICCPR, supra note 6, at art. 6(2); Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev. 6, 12 May 
2003, General Comments 6 & 20 (6).  Challenges to the death penalty under Article 6, therefore, 
tend to focus on the manner of execution.  See Mukherjee, supra note 11, at 510. 
 23.  See ICCPR, supra note 6, at art. 7.  A similar structure exists under the ECHR, 4 
November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, Eur. T.S. No. 5.  Article 2 of the ECHR contains a general right 
to life with a specific exception for the death penalty when lawfully imposed.  See id.  Article 3 of 
the ECHR prohibits “torture or other inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.”  Id.  A 
specific abolitionist protocol was added subsequently.  See ECHR Protocol No. 6, The Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the 
Death Penalty (Mar. 1, 1985). 
 24.  See Second Protocol, supra note 13 
 25.  See id. 
 26.  See BoRA § 28 (“An existing right or freedom shall not be held to be abrogated or 
restricted by reason only that the right or freedom is not included in this Bill of Rights or is included 
only in part.”); Knight, cert. denied, 529 U.S. at 997-98 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining 
that the United States Supreme Court has long treated “the way in which foreign courts have applied 
standards roughly comparable to our own constitutional standards in roughly comparable 
circumstances” as “relevant and informative” but not “binding”); cf. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 
412, 419 (1908) (describing foreign wage laws as not “technically speaking authorities” but rather 
relevant evidence of “widespread belief”); Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 
191, 198 (1815) (“The decisions of the Courts of every country . . . will be received, not as authority, 
but with respect.”). 
 27.  See, e.g., Television N.Z. Ltd. v. R., [1996] 3 NZLR 393, 395 (Ct. App.) (considering 
specific exceptions in the ICCPR in determining the scope of analogous provisions in BoRA); 
Simpson v. Attorney-General (“Baigent’s case”), [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (Ct. App.) (holding that the 
Crown could be held directly liable for a breach of BoRA in part because of a similar requirement 
in the ICCPR § 2 (3)).  But see R. v. Goodwin, [1993] 2 NZLR 153 (Ct. App.) (holding that, when 
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B. The Divergence 
The Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution, which contains the 
Eighth Amendment, predates the ICCPR by almost two hundred years, while 
BoRA was enacted more than a decade after New Zealand ratified the 
ICCPR.  As noted infra, the Eighth Amendment was modeled after the 
English Bill of Rights Act while BoRA Section 9 was modeled after the 
ICCPR.  As a result, there are textual differences between the anti-cruelty 
provisions of Section 9 of BoRA and the Eight Amendment, which are 
explored in the following section. 
 
III. Comparative Analysis: The Extent of, and Reasons for, the 
Differences Between the Two Systems 
 
Notwithstanding their shared historical origins, the meanings of 
prohibited cruelty and excessiveness in the United States and New Zealand 
have diverged considerably.  While there are textual differences between the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 9 of BoRA, 
they are insufficient to explain the divergent judicial application of the two 
prohibitions in the two countries.  Instead, the bulk of the differences relevant 
to this Article arise at the level of judicial application of similar doctrines to 
specific penal practices. 
 
A. The Sources of Prohibition: Text and Interpretation 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which tracks 
the English Bill of Rights 1689 verbatim, prohibits the infliction of cruel and 
unusual punishment.28  Section 9 of BoRA, which paraphrases Article 7 of 
the ICCPR, prohibits “torture or cruel, degrading, or disproportionately 
severe treatment or punishment.”29 
By its plain language, Section 9 of BoRA prohibits a broader range of 
conduct than the Eighth Amendment for several reasons.  First, it explicitly 
prohibits torture, degradation, and excessiveness, in addition to mere cruelty 
 
the language of BoRA is incompatible with parallel language in the ICCPR, the BoRA language 
must be followed). 
 28.  See U.S. CONSTITUTION, amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 29.  Section 9 reads in full: “Right not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment[.]  
Everyone has the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, degrading, or disproportionately 
severe treatment or punishment.”  BoRA § 9 (emphasis added).  See Taunoa v. Attorney-General, 
[2007] NZSC 70 at 172 (Blanchard, J.) (concluding that “the words ‘disproportionately severe’ 
must have been included to fulfil much the same role as ‘inhuman’ treatment or punishment plays 
in art 7 of the ICCPR”). 
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(and unusualness).  Second, it prohibits these types of treatment in the 
disjunctive (“or”), while the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual 
punishments in the conjunctive (“and”).  Third, Section 9 applies to all 
“treatment” that falls under the scope of its prohibitions, while the Eighth 
Amendment only prohibits “punishments” that are cruel.  Each of these 
distinctions is discussed in the following subsections in turn. 
 
1. The Prohibited Acts 
One obvious textual difference between the Eighth Amendment and 
Section 9 exists in the adjectives used to define the acts prohibited.  While 
both provisions prohibit cruelty, the United States Constitution limits its 
prohibition to punishments that are also “unusual,”30 while BoRA explicitly 
prohibits acts that are not only “cruel” but also that constitute “torture,” are 
“degrading,” or are “disproportionately severe.”31 
In practice, however, these textual variations have been rendered 
nugatory by judicial interpretation, since the Supreme Court of the United 
States interprets the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruelty to 
encompass torture, degradation, and disproportionality.32  The Court has 
specifically found that, when the Framers of the United States Constitution 
adopted the language of the prohibition against cruelty from the English Bill 
of Rights, they also adopted its proportionality principle, which prohibited 
excessive punishments.33  Therefore, excessive or disproportionate 
punishments are a subset of the cruelty prohibited, such that a punishment 
cannot be disproportionate without being cruel under the Eighth 
Amendment. 
 
2. The Relationship Between the Prohibited Acts 
Another obvious textual variation occurs in the respective uses of “and” 
and “or” to define the relationship between the acts prohibited by the Eighth 
 
 30.  U.S. CONST., amend. VIII. 
 31.  BoRA § 9. 
 32.  See Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (explaining that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishments “prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are 
disproportionate to the crime committed”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 281, 314 (1972) 
(holding that the arbitrary application of the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment and 
delineating four principles for defining cruelty, including degradation to human dignity, 
excessiveness, and arbitrariness). 
 33.  See Helm, 463 U.S. at 285-86.  This recognition of a proportionality principle, however, 
has not been unanimous among Supreme Court justices and has sometimes been hotly contested.  
See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961-94 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that 
Helm was wrongly decided and that the Eighth Amendment contained no proportionality 
requirement); see generally E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY 
PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS (2008). 
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Amendment and Section 9 of BoRA, respectively.  In the text of the Eighth 
Amendment, cruel “and” unusual are used in the conjunctive, whereas, in the 
text of Section 9, cruel, degrading, and disproportionately severe are used in 
the disjunctive.  A plain reading of these texts, therefore, might suggest that 
the Eighth Amendment would permit punishments that are cruel as long as 
they are common,34 but this textual variance between the Eighth Amendment 
and Section 9 of BoRA has also been rendered moot by way of judicial 
interpretation.  In Furman v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court made 
clear that cruelty, excessiveness, and societal abhorrence are cumulative 
concepts.35  This interpretation has a long historical pedigree.  At the time of 
the founding of the United States, the early state constitutions employed 
“cruel and unusual” and “cruel or unusual” interchangeably.36 
Unsurprisingly, given the disjunctive text of Section 9 of BoRA, in New 
Zealand, an act need only qualify as one of the prohibited descriptors to 
violate BoRA.  For example, in Taunoa v. Attorney-General,37 the New 
Zealand Supreme Court held that the use of solitary confinement on a 
prisoner whose mental condition made the punishment unsuitable was 
neither “cruel” nor “degrading,” but was nonetheless “disproportionately 
severe,” in violation of Section 9.38  Conversely, in the United States, the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the term “unusual” in the Eighth Amendment 
as a nullity, focusing only on the question of whether a challenged 
punishment is cruel (which, as indicated supra, includes torture, degradation, 
and excessiveness).39 
The result is that, under the Eighth Amendment, a punishment can be 
unusual (in the literal sense of novel or rare) as long as it is not cruel, but it 
cannot be cruel no matter how commonplace it may be.40  Therefore, by dint 
of judicial interpretation, both countries’ prohibitions preclude cruelty, 
 
 34.  See Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Prohibit Only 
Punishments That Are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 567 (2010). 
 35.  See Furman, 408 U.S. at 243-44 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 36.  See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966; BESSLER, supra note 16, at 118-19; Anthony F. Granucci, 
“Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 
840 (1969) (characterizing the language “cruel and unusual” as “constitutional ‘boilerplate’”); see 
also Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights under State Constitutions When the 
Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American History 
and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 78 (2008).  Compare, e.g., MD. DECL. RTS., art. 14 (prohibiting 
laws inflicting “cruel and unusual pains and penalties”) with MD. DECL. RTS., art. 22 (prohibiting 
courts from inflicting “cruel or unusual punishments”). 
 37.  Taunoa v. Attorney-General, [2007] NZSC 70. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  In determining excessiveness, however, the Court does sometimes consider the regularity 
with which the punishment is imposed for the particular offense at issue.  See, e.g., Helm, 463 U.S. 
at 292 (including the consistency with which a punishment is imposed within and across 
jurisdictions as a primary factor in determining whether it is unconstitutionally excessive). 
 40.  But see Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994-95 (Scalia, J., concurring) (distinguishing cruelty from 
unconstitutional unusualness). 
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torture, degradation, and excessiveness, separately, without regard to the 
regularity (i.e., usualness) with which they may occur. 
 
3. The Role of Punitive Intent 
The clearest textual divergence between the Eighth Amendment and 
Section 9 of BoRA occurs at the level of the nature of the acts that the two 
provisions prohibit and their accompanying mens rea.  The Eighth 
Amendment only prohibits cruel and unusual “punishment,” as opposed to 
BoRA, which prohibits any cruel “treatment,” regardless of whether it 
constitutes a punishment.  This textual distinction has become significant at 
the level of judicial interpretation. 
The United States Supreme Court has read the term “punishment” to 
imply an intent requirement in the prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment.41  
In New Zealand, by contrast, while it remains a somewhat open question 
whether inhumane treatment has to be inflicted for the purpose of 
punishment to violate Section 9 of BoRA,42 the weight of judicial authority 
suggests that the prohibition is not so limited, at least regarding the 
prohibitions against cruelty, degradation, or excessive punishment.43  For 
example, in Wolf v. Minister of Immigration,44 while ultimately concluding 
that it was not disproportionately severe under the circumstances, the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal determined that deportation was a form of 
 
 41.  Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991) (“The source of the intent requirement is . . . 
the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans only cruel and unusual punishment.  If the pain inflicted 
is not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element 
must be attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify.”) (emphasis added); see also 
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d. Cir. 1973) (“The thread common to all [Eighth 
Amendment prison-condition cases] is that ‘punishment’ has been deliberately administered for a 
penal or disciplinary purpose. . . .”); Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(“The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter.”). 
 42.  Compare Taunoa, [2007] NZSC 70 at 69 (Elias, J.) (asserting that purpose is irrelevant 
to the determination of whether treatment is cruel, degrading, or disproportionately severe); id. at 
171 (Blanchard, J.) (“All forms of conduct proscribed by s 9 are of great seriousness. . . .  The worst 
is torture, which involves the deliberate infliction of severe physical or mental suffering for a 
particular purpose, such as obtaining information.  Treatment or punishment that lacks such an 
ulterior purpose can be characterised as cruel if the suffering that results is severe or is deliberately 
inflicted. . . .  [T]reatment or punishment is degrading if it gravely humiliates and debases the person 
subjected to it, whether or not that is its purpose.”); with id. at ¶ 294 (Tipping, J.) (“It is, however, 
of moment to whether there has been a breach of s 9 to consider the state of mind of the party said 
to be in breach. . . .”). 
 43.  See Fraser-Jones v. Solicitor-General, [2010] NZCA 622 at 47 (noting that, unlike other 
provisions of BoRA whose plain language applies to individuals who are arrested or in detention, 
section 9’s plain language applies to “everyone”); Vaihu v. Attorney-General, [2007] NZCA 574 
(interpreting Taunoa to stand for the proposition that the “[i]ntention to cause suffering is not a 
prerequisite for a finding that there has been cruel, degrading, or disproportionately severe 
treatment or punishment”). 
 44.  [2004] 7 H.R.N.Z. 469. 
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“treatment” governed by the limitations of Section 9, regardless of whether 
it was being imposed for the purpose of punishment.45 
 
B. An Overview of Judicial Application 
Despite judicial interpretations that largely iron out textual variations 
between the Eighth Amendment and BoRA regarding criminal punishment, 
in application, the provisions have very different scopes, particularly when 
it comes to interpretations of excessiveness in the context of their respective 
proportionality principles.  Both countries’ courts treat excessiveness as a 
question of proportionality: a sentence is impermissibly excessive if it is 
disproportionately severe in relation to the offense for which it is imposed.  
In application, however, American and New Zealand courts have very 
different conceptions of disproportionality. 
 
1. The United States 
The United States is the country with the most incarcerated population 
on earth.46  Between 1970 and 2010, the prison population increased tenfold, 
from 200,000 to more than two million, far surpassing the increase in any 
other industrialized democracy.47  This surge in incarceration was driven by 
“tough on crime” policies, including lengthy sentences of imprisonment.48 
 
 45.  See id. While this distinction between the two constitutional provisions—restricting only 
treatment intended as punishment versus restricting all treatment that is cruel or degrading, 
regardless of whether it is intended to punish—is a significant variation between the two provisions 
in the context of cruel treatment that is not intended as punishment (for example, preventive 
detention), it is not significant for the topic explored in this Article, which focuses on criminal 
sanctions that are by definition intended to punish. Cf. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) 
(holding that Kansas’s indefinite postconviction commitment scheme for sexually violent predators 
did not constitute “punishment” for the purpose of the prohibitions against double jeopardy or ex 
post facto punishment because it was not established with a punitive retributive or deterrent intent); 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (holding that stripping American citizens of 
their nationality as a sanction for draft dodging during World War II, in the absence of notice, 
confrontation, compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, trial by jury, and assistance of counsel, 
violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution because the stripping of 
nationality was “penal in character” because it was intended as punishment).  Criminal punishments 
imposed after conviction for crimes, like terms of imprisonment or the death penalty, 
unquestionably fit within the scope of the “punishment” and “treatment” that the Eighth 
Amendment and Section 9 of BoRA both prohibit, respectively. 
 46.  STATISTITA RESEARCH DEPARTMENT (2019), COUNTRIES WITH THE MOST PRISONERS 
PER 100,000 INHABITANTS AS OF JULY 2019, https://www.statista.com/statistics/262962/countries-
with-the-most-prisoners-per-100-000-inhabitants/  
 47.  See PATRICK SHARKEY, UNEASY PEACE: THE GREAT CRIME DECLINE, THE RENEWAL 
OF CITY LIFE, AND THE NEXT WAR ON VIOLENCE 48 (2018); Joachim J. Savelsberg, Punitive Turn 
and Justice Cascade: Mutual Inspiration from Punishment and Society and Human Rights 
Literatures, 20 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 73, 75 (2018). 
 48.  See JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK 
AMERICA 7 (2017). 
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One factor that enabled the explosion of the prison population in the 
United States is the fact that the United States Supreme Court has interpreted 
the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruelty and excessiveness as being 
largely limited in practice to the regulation of the application—but not 
outright abolition—of the death penalty.49  For example, the Court has used 
the Eighth Amendment proportionality limitations to regulate the types of 
offenses and offenders to which the death penalty may apply,50 as well as the 
manner in which executions may be carried out.51 
 
 49.  Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that the Eighth 
Amendment imposed only a “narrow” proportionality principle in noncapital cases); Rummel v. 
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272–74 (1980) (explaining, in the context of Eighth Amendment 
proportionality analysis, that “a sentence of death differs in kind from any sentence of 
imprisonment, no matter how long” and concluding that there was no precedent for a constitutional 
limitation on the length of the prison sentences that legislatures chose to impose for felony 
offenses); see Rachel A. Van Cleave, ‘Death Is Different’—Is Money Different? Criminal 
Punishments, Forfeitures, and Punitive Damages – Shifting Constitutional Paradigms for 
Assessing Proportionality, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 217 (2003). 
 50.  See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding that the death penalty was 
a cruel and unusual punishment when applied for the rape of a child); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005) (holding that the application of the death penalty to offenders who were juveniles at the 
time of their offenses violated the Eighth Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
(holding that the application of the death penalty to individuals suffering from significant 
intellectual disabilities violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishments); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (holding that executing children who 
were younger than sixteen years old at the time that they committed a crime violated the Eighth 
Amendment); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding that the execution of an offender 
who was legally insane was cruel and unusual); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) 
(holding that death was a “grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of 
rape”); Kevin M. Barry, The Death Penalty and the Dignity Clauses, 102 IOWA L. REV. 383, 404-
11 (2017) (discussing a line of United States Supreme Court cases categorically prohibiting the 
imposition of death penalty for offenders who were insane, had intellectual disabilities, were 
juveniles, or committed offenses other than murder). 
 51.  Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(characterizing burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, quartering, the rack, and 
the thumbscrew as cruel and unusual punishments); Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 446-47 (characterizing 
burning at the stake, crucifixion, and breaking on the wheel as cruel and unusual punishments); see 
also State v. Gainer, 3 N.C. 140 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq. 1801) (holding that execution by peine forte 
et dure (being pressed to death) violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments in 
North Carolina’s state constitution).  The Eighth Amendment has also been interpreted to prohibit 
severe corporal punishments.  Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 660 (1977); Furman, 408 U.S. at 
330 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[T]here are certain punishments that inherently involve so much 
physical pain and suffering that civilized people cannot tolerate them—e.g., use of the rack, the 
thumbscrew, or other mont. Regardless of public sentiment with respect to imposition of one of 
these punishments in a particular case or at any one moment in history, the Constitution prohibits 
it.”); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (holding that Weems’s sentence of fifteen years 
hard labor in shackles for the crime of falsifying official records constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that a prison’s practice 
of “handcuffing inmates to the fence and to cells for long periods of time” was a form of corporal 
punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment).  Nonetheless, the Court has also rejected 
multiple challenges to capital punishment claiming that the manner of execution was cruel and 
unusual.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (rejecting a claim by death-row inmates that 
B - LEONETTI_CLQ_V47-4 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2020  10:27 AM 
546 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 47:4 
The Eighth Amendment does not generally place any meaningful limits 
on the length or severity of prison sentences that legislatures can authorize 
or judges can impose upon competent adult offenders, although the Court 
has used it to limit sentences of life without the possibility of parole for 
juvenile offenders (i.e., offenders who were under the age of eighteen at the 
time of the commission of their crimes).52  More than twenty years ago, in 
his landmark article “The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure 
and Criminal Justice,” William Stuntz decried the failure of the American 
constitutional law to police “the content of substantive constitutional law” 
and advocated for the meaningful application of a “proportionality rule” that 
would bar “oversentencing.”53  This complaint is exemplified by the fact that 
the United States Supreme Court has only on one occasion held a sentence 
of imprisonment to be unconstitutionally excessive when applied to an adult 
offender, despite several other compelling opportunities to do so.54  
Otherwise, it has repeatedly upheld sentences of life imprisonment for 
relatively minor property offenses in the face of Eighth Amendment 
challenges.55 
 
Oklahoma’s lethal-injection protocol created an unacceptable risk of severe pain during execution, 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (rejecting a challenge to 
Kentucky’s lethal-injection execution protocol on the ground that the pain and suffering that it 
inflicted on a condemned inmate constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Louisiana ex rel. 
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (rejecting the claim that death by electrocution was a 
cruel and unusual punishment); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878) (upholding the 
constitutionality of Wilkerson’s sentence of death by firing squad for murder). 
 52.  Compare Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (holding that a mandatory sentence of 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, which precluded the consideration of mitigating 
circumstances, imposed upon a juvenile homicide offender violated the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition against excessive punishment) and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (holding that 
the Eighth Amendment prohibited the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole on a juvenile offender for a non-homicide offense) with McElvaine v. Brush, 
142 U.S. 155 (1891) (rejecting McElvaine’s Eighth Amendment challenge to his extended term of 
solitary confinement while awaiting the execution of his death sentence). 
 53.  William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal 
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997).  Stuntz anchors his proportionality argument in due process, rather 
than cruelty under the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 68. 
 54.  Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (finding that Helm’s sentence of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole for passing a fraudulent one-hundred-dollar check violated the Eighth 
Amendment); Steven Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing: The Supreme Court’s 
Tortured Approach to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 84 KY. L.J. 107, 161–62 (1995).  See 
generally Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and 
Excessive Penalties, 144 PENN. L. REV. 101 (1995). 
 55.  Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (declining to reverse as unreasonable a lower 
court’s rejection of Andrade’s Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence of fifty-years-to-life 
imprisonment for two acts of shoplifting a total of nine videotapes); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 
11 (2003) (rejecting Ewing’s Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence of twenty-five-years-
to-life imprisonment for stealing three golf clubs); Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957 (upholding Harmelin’s 
mandatory-minimum sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a first 
offense of possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) 
B - LEONETTI_CLQ_V47-4 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2020  10:27 AM 
Summer 2020] COMPARATIVE CRUELTY 547 
2. New Zealand 
New Zealand is relatively carceral by international standards,56 
although, of course, no other democracy plays in the same league of 
imprisonment as the United States.57  Nonetheless, in contrast to the United 
States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, New 
Zealand courts demonstrably understand the proportionality requirement 
of Section 9 of BoRA to be more robust, prohibiting even relatively short 
prison sentences if they are disproportionate to the circumstances of the 
offense or offender.  For example, in R. v. P,58 the High Court in Auckland 
declined to impose any sentence of imprisonment upon an intellectually 
disabled offender who forcibly raped an intellectually disabled victim in 
revenge for her perceived mistreatment of his brother because doing so 
would be disproportionate to the offense and, therefore, cruel in violation 
of Section 9.59 
 
IV. Application of the Cruelty Provisions to the Death Penalty 
 
A. Divergent Values and Conceptions of Cruelty 
A constitution is not simply a document that structures rights and 
obligations.  It is also an expression of national tradition and character.  This 
duality becomes evident when comparing the way that courts in the United 
States and New Zealand apply their textually and historically similar bans on 
government cruelty and excessive punishments to the specific practice of the 
death penalty and the judicial factfinding that accompanies those 
applications. 
While the United States Supreme Court has found that administration 
of the death penalty in specific situations or manners violates the Eighth 
Amendment,60 it has consistently held that the practice of capital punishment 
 
(rejecting Davis’s Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence of forty years imprisonment for 
distributing approximately nine ounces of marijuana); Rummel, 445 U.S. 263 (rejecting Rummel’s 
Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence of ten-years-to-life imprisonment for a “third strike” 
nonviolent property offense).  This failure of the Eighth Amendment to limit terms of imprisonment 
has led to radical expansion of the use of sentences of life without the possibility of parole in the 
United States in the twenty-first century. Christopher Seeds, Bifurcation Nation: American Penal 
Policy in Late Mass Incarceration, 19 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 590, 598 (2017). 
 56.  See Lauren-Brooke Eisen, The Private Prison Experiments: Is There Any Positive in For-
Profit Imprisonment?, SALON (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.salon.com/2019/02/25/the-private-
prison-experiments-is-there-any-positive-in-for-profit-imprisonment/ (explaining that Australia 
and New Zealand have two of the world’s most rapidly expanding prison populations). 
 57.  See supra Section III(B)(1). 
 58.  (1993) 10 CRNZ 250 (HC). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
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is not categorically cruel and unusual.61  The New Zealand Supreme Court, 
by contrast, considers the imposition of the death penalty to be a per se 
violation of the prohibitions against cruelty contained in Section 9 of BoRA 
and Article 7 of the ICCPR.62 
While New Zealand abolished its domestic death penalty a year before 
the enactment of BoRA,63 its courts have had to address the relationship 
between Section 9 of BoRA, ICCPR Article 7, and the death penalty in the 
context of other countries’ requests for extradition from New Zealand of 
individuals charged with offenses abroad under the Extradition Act.64  In this 
 
 61.  Gregg, 428 U.S. 153 (holding that capital punishment did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment because it served the valid penological purposes of retribution and deterrence); Trop 
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958) (“Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, 
both on moral grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment—and they are 
forceful—the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day when it is still 
widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty.”); Kemmler, 136 
U.S. at 447 (upholding the constitutionality of Kemmler’s sentence of death by electrocution, 
reasoning that “[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the 
punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution”); see 
also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (holding Louisiana’s mandatory death-penalty 
scheme unconstitutional, but also specifically holding that the imposition of the death penalty was 
not per se cruel and unusual punishment); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) 
(holding that North Carolina’s mandatory death penalty for first-degree murder violated the Eighth 
Amendment, but also specifically holding that the imposition of the death penalty was not per se 
cruel and unusual punishment); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding Texas’s guided-
discretion capital-sentencing scheme against the claim that the death penalty was per se cruel and 
unusual punishment); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding Florida’s procedures for 
weighing aggravating and mitigating factors in capital cases against a claim that the death penalty 
was per se unconstitutional); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: 
Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 355 (1995). 
 62.  This is consistent with the consensus of most of the international community.  Mukherjee, 
supra note 12, at 508 (“It is widely acknowledged that the imposition of the death penalty 
constitutes cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.”). 
 63.  New Zealand de facto abolished capital punishment in 1961 and de jure abolished it in 
1989.  Newbold, supra note 13, at 170.  Between 1961 and 1989, the death penalty was maintained 
only for the offense of treason, but the punishment was never imposed again.  Id.  This is consistent 
with the seminal work by Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, which found that a sustained 
period of de facto abolition of the death penalty generally precedes de jure abolition internationally.  
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN 
AGENDA 21–23 (1986). 
 64.  Under the Extradition Act, before ordering an individual’s surrender for extradition to 
another country to stand trial for an offence against the law of that country, the Minister of Justice 
must consider several discretionary factors, including whether “it would be unjust or oppressive to 
surrender the person.”  Extradition Act 1999, § 8 (1).  The Act specifically provides that the 
Minister should not surrender the person if “there are substantial grounds for believing that the 
person would be in danger of being subjected to an act of torture in the extradition country.”  § 
30(2)(b).  The Minister may refuse to surrender the person if the person may be sentenced to death 
in the extradition country.  § 30(3)(a).  While Section 30(3)(a) is phrased in discretionary terms, 
New Zealand courts have held that the Minister should not surrender an individual who is likely 
subject to death penalty abroad.  See Kim v. Minister of Justice, [2017] NZHC 2109 at 113.  Judge 
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context, New Zealand courts have determined that both Section 9 of BoRA 
and ICCPR Article 7 prohibit the extradition of individuals to another 
country to stand trial for an offence against the law of that country if there 
are substantial grounds for believing that these offenders would be subject 
to cruel, degrading, or disproportionately severe treatment or punishment.65  
Being subject to the death penalty in the country seeking extradition qualifies 
as such prohibited treatment.66 
This divergence of constitutional values is consistent with the 
preexisting social-science literature around abolition.  In their seminal work, 
Capital Punishment and the American Agenda, Franklin Zimring and 
Gordon Hawkins found that reconception of the death penalty as a human 
rights issue, rather than a criminal justice issue, tends to precede its abolition, 
even in the face of public support for the death penalty, in “modern 
democracies.”67  In The Death Penalty, a Worldwide Perspective, Roger 
Hood and Carolyn Hoyle similarly found that a hallmark of the international 
evolution away from capital punishment is the emergence of international 
human rights law and its commitment to “the protection of citizens from the 






v. Canada, Communication No. 829/1998,78th Session of the HRC, 20 October 2003, U.N. Doc. 
A/58/40 (Vol. Il), at 76 (holding that Canada had violated Judge’s right to life under Article 6 of 
the ECHR by extraditing him to the United States without first obtaining assurances that he would 
not be subjected to the death penalty there).  Although the ICCPR lacks a specific extradition 
prohibition, cf. U.N. Convention Against Torture, Art. 3 (1) (“No State Party shall expel, return 
(‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing 
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”), the position of the Extradition Act is 
consistent with the consensus view within the international community generally and the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee (“H.R.C.”) specifically. 
 65.  See Attorney-General v. Zaoui, [2005] NZSC 38; Kim v. Minister of Justice, [2016] 
NZHC 1490. 
 66.  See Judge, supra note 64, at 76–103 (ruling that States that have abolished the death 
penalty could not extradite individuals to States that have retained the death penalty in an absence 
of a credible assurance that the death penalty would not be imposed upon return).  Of course, 
because New Zealand is a signatory to the death penalty protocol, as well as the main body of the 
ICCPR, it has specific obligations not to extradite defendants to countries where they may face the 
death penalty from that protocol.  In practice, this sometimes obscures the rationale of New Zealand 
courts’ refusal to permit extradition, since such refusal could stem either from the specific dictates 
of the death penalty protocol or the more general prohibitions of Article 7 of the ICCPR.  Prior to 
the ratification of the Death Penalty Protocol, however, many other countries had already deemed 
the death penalty to violate Article 7. 
 67.  ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 63, at 21–23. 
 68.  See ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY, A WORLDWIDE 
PERSPECTIVE 22 (5th ed. 2015). 
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B. The Nature of Proportionality 
Retribution is generally regarded as the primary basis of punishment.69  
Contrary to mistaken conceptions of vengeance, retribution can function as 
a limitation on permissible punishments.70  The prohibitions against cruelty 
and excessiveness in the Eighth Amendment and Section 9 of BoRA are 
limiting principles, in the sense that they limit the responses that legislatures 
and judges otherwise could give to serious criminal conduct. 
The divergent views about the death penalty in constitutional 
jurisprudence in the United States and New Zealand reflect more than just a 
divergence of doctrine, but rather a divergence of values and findings of 
constitutional fact,71 which are reflected in the normative nature of the 
excessiveness limitation.  Because both countries’ courts have inherited and 
continued to apply a proportionality principle in their interpretations of their 
respective prohibitions against cruel and excessive punishments, the 
disagreements between courts in the United States and New Zealand about 
which specific punishments are (or are not) cruelly excessive must ultimately 
reduce to a disagreement of judicial philosophy about whether and under 
what circumstances, if any, a particular sentence is unacceptably excessive. 
In the context of the death penalty, this is a disagreement about whether 
a death sentence is impermissibly cruel and, therefore, what it means for a 
punishment (death) to be disproportionate in relation to a criminal offense.  
Because the death penalty remains in effect in the United States only for 
intentional homicides, this is really a disagreement more specifically about 
the disproportionality of a sentence of death when it is imposed as a 
punishment for the crime of murder—the core of the traditional, lex talionis 
“eye for an eye,” justification for capital punishment.  The thesis of this 
Article is that the competing understandings of proportionality in the United 
States and New Zealand, reduce to a disagreement about the primary purpose 
of punishment, generally, and of the proportionality principle, specifically—
to wit, whether it is a principle of retribution or a principle of utility. 
 
1. Retribution 
The United States Supreme Court’s continued tolerance of the death 
penalty under the Eighth Amendment is consistent with a criminal justice 
view of the death penalty and stems primarily from a sometimes 
unarticulated assumption that proportionality is primarily an expressive and 
 
 69.  See Danielle S. Allen, Democratic Disease: Of Anger and the Troubling Nature of 
Punishment, in SUSAN BANDES (ed.), THE PASSIONS OF LAW (2001), at 205.  But see THOMAS 
HOBBES, HOBBES’S LEVIATHAN 240 (1958) (arguing that punishment should be based on 
deterrence or rehabilitation rather than retribution). 
 70.  See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 3 (1651). 
 71.  See Fontana, supra note 7, at 556 n.79 (explaining how balancing tests, value judgments 
like “reasonableness,” and consequential reasoning are a form of constitutional factfinding).  
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retributive doctrine.72  In analyzing the cruel excessiveness of punishments, 
while it often pays lip service to other justifications for punishment 
(typically, incapacitation or deterrence),73 the Court largely determines 
proportionality by balancing the severity of the punishment against the 
gravity of the offense for which the sentence is being imposed and the extent 
of the offender’s culpability.74  In doing so, it defines gravity with regard 
primarily to “the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society.”75  In 
this formulation, the severity of a criminal act is a normative evaluation, 
based on cultural values.76  The Court’s refusal to permit capital punishment 
for individuals with intellectual disabilities or juvenile offenders, due to their 
diminished decision-making capacity, are examples of its use of a retributive 
understanding of proportionality, based on an offender’s lessened 
culpability, as a limiting principle.77  American legal scholars similarly seem 
to assume that proportionality is an exclusively retributive value.  For 
example, Stuntz defines proportionality as a question of “whether the people 
being punished deserve the punishment they receive.”78 
The divergence between the understandings of proportionality by courts 
in the United States and New Zealand does not seem to occur at the level of 
the gravity of the offense committed or the degree of the offender’s 
 
 72.  See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 32 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the concept of 
proportionality was inherently tied to retributive goals); King, supra note 54, at 192 
(“Proportionality can only be measured in relationship to the owner’s culpability. . . .”).  See 
generally JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 
(1970); MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1997); 
PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS 
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS (1993).  But 
see Margaret Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 PENN. L. REV. 989, 1047–48 (1978) (arguing that the Eighth 
Amendment establishes both retributive and utilitarian limits to punishment). 
 73.  See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2767 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he death penalty’s 
penological rationale in fact rests almost exclusively upon a belief in its tendency to deter and upon 
its ability to satisfy a community’s interest in retribution.”). 
 74.  See Helm, 463 U.S. at 292 (explaining that Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis 
should be guided by, inter alia, “the gravity of the offense”); Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (explaining 
that the death penalty is unconstitutionally “excessive” if it “is grossly out of proportion to the 
severity of the crime”); see, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (extensively examining 
Enmund’s lack of intent to kill and his status as an accessory rather than principal in holding that 
his death sentence for felony murder was unconstitutionally disproportionate to his offense); cf. 
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (“The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry 
under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture 
must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.”).  See 
generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 
(1987).  
 75.  Helm, 463 U.S. at 292. 
 76.  See Peter H. Rossi et al., The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual 
Differences, 39 AMER. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 224, 224 (1974). 
 77.  See Simmons, 543 U.S. 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. 
 78.  Stuntz, supra note 53, at 66. 
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culpability.  In other words, murder, torture, and sexual violation are viewed 
as no less grave by courts in New Zealand and motive, intent, purpose, 
deliberation, capacity, a high degree of participation, and lack of remorse no 
less aggravating than they are by courts in the United States.  Instead, it is in 
some other aspect of proportionality balancing over which courts in the two 
countries disagree. 
 
2. Excessiveness and the Weighing of Interests 
The proportionality balancing test that the United States Supreme Court 
employs (the severity of the offense weighed against the retributive factors 
that militate in favor of a lesser punishment) itself reflects another implicit 
balance between two underlying competing interests: On the one hand, the 
legitimate societal benefits and purposes to imposing punishment, in general, 
and a severe punishment, in particular; on the other hand, some other, 
external value that limits the range of that punishment is appropriate as a 
response to the offense committed.  It is, to some extent, a cost-benefit 
analysis, which weighs the penological benefits of the death penalty against 
its societal costs. 
The divergence of understandings of proportionality between courts in 
the United States and New Zealand does not seem to involve the first half of 
the value balancing, the question of whether the penological objectives that 
the death penalty seeks to achieve (primarily retribution and secondarily 
incapacitation and deterrence) are permissible per se.79  Instead, it involves 
a disagreement around the gravity of the societal and individual costs of 
having a death penalty and the weighing of those costs against capital 
punishment’s objectives (i.e., the death penalty’s effectiveness in 
comparison to other alternatives).80  In other words, the two countries’ 
judicial philosophies diverge at the latter end of this balancing test (whether 
there is some reason, besides the insufficient seriousness of the offense or 
the offender’s culpability, to limit the severity of the societal response to the 
crime) and in the balancing itself (whether the death penalty is a proportional 
means to achieve whatever its positive societal ends are thought to be).81 
 
 79.  This is not to suggest that these former interests—the societal benefits of the death 
penalty—are not debatable, particularly deterrence and incapacitation, which are utilitarian 
considerations that are subject to empirical proof or disproof.  Perhaps because retribution is among 
the frequently identified benefits of the death penalty, the New Zealand courts simply do not seem 
to plant their flag on this particular battlefield. 
 80.  These two factors, the weight of the interests against the death penalty and the balance of 
those interests when weighed against its purposes, of course, are interrelated. 
 81.  But see Kevin M. Barry, The Law of Abolition, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521, 
535 (2017) (arguing that death-penalty abolition occurs when courts decide that retribution is an 
illegitimate goal of punishment). 
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Courts in New Zealand purport to take a more human-rights approach 
to punishment, focusing on what Hood and Hoyle characterize as “a 
fundamental violation of human rights: not only the right to life but the right 
to be free of excessive, repressive, and tortuous punishments.”82  
Nonetheless, this is not a pure human-rights focus because it entails, inter 
alia, a judgment that the death penalty itself does not serve any legitimate 
penological purpose, a utilitarian rather than purely retributive or humanist 
consideration.  The New Zealand courts take issue with the results of the 
death penalty and with its use as the means to achieve its purposes, rather 
than with those purposes themselves.  This entails weighing the 
consequences of execution against the consequences of other responses to 
the offence, rather than weighing the seriousness of the punishment against 
the seriousness of the offence. 
Because of this, the courts in the United States and New Zealand 
disagree primarily about the necessity of the death penalty to achieve its 
purported penological aims.83  This second consideration—the weight that 
 
 82.  HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 68, at 22. 
 83.  Cf. Baze, 553 U.S. at 78–86 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that 
the death penalty was “patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth 
Amendment” in part because it served no penological purpose); Furman, 408 U.S. at 288–306 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (finding that the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment in part 
because of its failure to deter crime or deliver retribution in light of its ineffective and arbitrary 
imposition); Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 890–91 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the death penalty violated the proportionality requirement of the Eighth Amendment because 
it was no more effective at achieving permissible aims of punishment than other penalties); Moore 
v. Parker, 425 F.3d 250, 268–70 (6th Cir. 2005) (Martin, J., dissenting) (arguing that bias and 
arbitrariness deprived it of its legitimate interest in retribution and general deterrence); People v. 
Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894–99 (Cal. 1972) (holding California’s death penalty unconstitutional 
under the cruel-and-unusual-punishment clause of the California Constitution, in part because of 
its failure effectively to deter crime), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, 
§ 27 (amending the state constitution to permit the death penalty); State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 
55–73 (Conn. 2015) (holding that capital punishment violated the cruel-and-unusual-punishment 
clause of the Connecticut Constitution in part because its unreliability, arbitrariness, and bias 
deprived it of any legitimate penological objective); District Attorney v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 
1282–83 (Mass. 1980) (“The calculated killing of a human being by the State involves, by its very 
nature, a denial of the executed person’s humanity.”), superseded by constitutional amendment; 
State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126, 136–41 (Tenn. 1981) (Brock, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (arguing that the death penalty violated the cruel-and-unusual-punishment clause 
of the Tennessee Constitution because it was unacceptable to contemporary society, served no 
legitimate purpose, and was “barbarous”); Ex Parte Panetti, 450 S.W.3d 144, 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2014) (Price, J., dissenting) (arguing that the death penalty was unconstitutional because “the 
execution of individuals does not appear to measurably advance the retribution and deterrence 
purposes served by the death penalty; the life without parole option adequately protects society at 
large in the same way as the death penalty punishment option; and the risk of executing an innocent 
person for a capital murder is unreasonably high . . .”); Pierre v. Utah, 572 P.2d 1338, 1359 (Utah 
1977) (Maughan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting “vengeance” as a legitimate 
penological purpose); Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 207–16 (Wyo. 1981) (Rose, C.J., dissenting 
in part and concurring in part) (arguing that capital punishment lacked a legitimate penological 
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should be allocated to the reasons not to utilize a punishment to achieve ends 
that are otherwise justifiable penologically is what Richard Frase has termed 
“ends disproportionality.”84  The courts in New Zealand also tend to give 
more weight to necessity considerations—such as whether there are other 
available means to accomplish those penological objectives (what Frase calls 
“means disproportionality”85)—in determining whether the justifications for 
the death penalty are outweighed by its costs. 
Both of these proportionality objections to the death penalty are 
instrumentalist and utilitarian in nature, rather than expressive or 
retributive.86  As such, they evidence a more utilitarian conception of 
proportionality, consistent with Beccaria’s formulation: 
 
The purpose [of punishment] can only be to prevent the criminal 
from inflicting new injuries on its citizens and to deter others from 
similar acts. Always keeping due proportions, such punishments 
and such method of inflicting them ought to be chosen, therefore, 
which will make the strongest and most lasting impression on the 
minds of men, and inflict the least torment on the body of the 
criminal. . . . For a punishment to attain its end, the evil which it 
inflicts has only to exceed the advantage derivable from the crime.  
In this excess of evil one should include the certainty of 
punishment and the loss of the good which the crime might have 
produced.87 
 
V. Methodological Limitations 
One obvious methodological drawback to this comparative analysis 
exists because New Zealand lacks a death penalty, not because the New 
Zealand Supreme Court prohibited its use after determining that it violated 
BoRA Section 9 or ICCPR Article 7, but rather because the New Zealand 
 
purpose because retribution was not a legitimate goal for criminal punishment); Arthur J. Goldberg, 
Memorandum to the Conference Re: Capital Punishment, October Term, 1963, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 
493, 502–03 (1986) (suggesting that the death penalty constituted per se cruel-and-unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment because it failed to further the legitimate 
penological objectives of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation and because “vengeance” 
was an illegitimate penological objective). 
 84.  Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth 
Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 592–95 (2005). 
 85.  See Frase, supra note 84 at 595–96. 
 86.  See id. at 592; see also Grossman, supra note 54, at 168 n. 386 (describing the parsimony 
principle, which requires punishment to be no more severe than necessary to accomplish its 
legitimate penological objectives, as a utilitarian principle).  See generally NIELS PETERSEN, 
PROPORTIONALITY AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION IN 
CANADA, GERMANY AND SOUTH AFRICA (2017). 
 87.  BECCARIA, supra note 2. 
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Parliament abolished it legislatively.  Furthermore, because New Zealand, 
unlike the United States, is a signatory to the Death Penalty Protocol, the 
question of whether it is bound to abolish the death penalty is conclusively 
established by its obligations under that protocol.  The result of the 
combination of these two factors—the political nature of the abolition of the 
death penalty in New Zealand and its additional, explicit treaty obligations 
under the death penalty protocol—confounds the comparative analysis 
because it renders any discussion by courts in New Zealand of the 
relationship between the death penalty and Section 9 of BoRA and Article 7 
of the ICCPR dicta.  In other words, the Death Penalty Protocol would 
obligate New Zealand not to extradite international defendants to countries 
where they face the death penalty regardless of whether its domestic courts 
believed that its imposition violated Section 9 of BoRA or Article 7 of the 
ICCPR.  Those courts’ discussions of the proportionality of the death penalty 
in relation to capital crimes in other countries are, therefore, necessarily 
sparse and sometimes insufficiently reasoned.  In addition, the rationales for 
the abolition of the death penalty are already expressly laid out in the Death 
Penalty Protocol, which further detracts from the depths of New Zealand 
courts’ consideration of the balance between the purposes of the penalty, the 
ends that it purports to accomplish, and the means by which it attempts to 
accomplish them.88 
Nonetheless, while the New Zealand courts’ discussion of the death 
penalty are a narrower window, made from largely obiter dictum, they 
nonetheless allow a partial view of the courts’ jurisprudential traditions 
surrounding the death penalty. It is noteworthy that these opinions, however 
sparse, do not simply say “We must refuse to extradite this individual under 
our treaty obligations,” but rather clearly demonstrate the courts’ views of 
the penalty of death itself as a cruel and excessive one. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
A nation’s constitution is an embodiment of its traditions, character, and 
identity.89  The United States has a long (and arguably sordid) history of both 
cultural and constitutional exceptionalism,90 and its approach to defining 
 
 88.  See Second Protocol, supra note 13, Preamble (identifying “human dignity” and “the 
enjoyment of the right to life” as the justifications for requiring abolition of the death penalty). 
 89.  See George P. Fletcher, Constitutional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 737 (1993). 
 90.  See Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 772 
(1997) (“[T]he global transformation [of constitutionalism] has not yet had the slightest impact on 
American constitutional thought.”); Clare L’Heureux-Dube, The Importance of Dialogue: 
Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 21 (1998) 
(noting the refusal of American courts to consider the constitutional decisions of courts in other 
countries); Adrienne Stone, Comparativism in Constitutional Interpretation, 2009 N.Z. L. REV. 45, 
57; see, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (“[C]omparative analysis [is] 
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“cruelty” is no exception.91  The Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Section 9 of the New Zealand BoRA share historical 
antecedents and language, and both countries are signatories to the ICCPR.  
However, the constitutional cultures and judicial interpretations around the 
acceptable limits of the State’s right to punish, particularly by death, have 
diverged considerably in the two countries.92  This divergence is best 
explained not by reference to textual differences between the Eighth 
Amendment and Section 9, but rather by reference to the two countries’ 
prevailing judicial philosophies surrounding the meaning and purpose of the 
proportionality constraint on excessive punishment. 
This explanation matters for anyone who wishes to see the United States 
abolish its death penalty because it suggests that abolition will not come 
through doctrinal advocacy alone, at least not through advocacy that fails to 
account for the unique judicial philosophy of retribution employed by 
American courts. Only a shift in focus from the “ends” that the death penalty 
is perceived to bring to a focus on the “means” by which it achieves those 
ends, particularly in light of other penological options, will move American 
courts toward a more robust consideration of the acceptability of a 
punishment that most of the rest of the world’s courts consider barbaric. 
 
 
inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution.”).  See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, 
DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996). 
 91.  See, e.g., Thompson, 487 U.S. at 869 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the 
majority opinion holding that executing children who were younger than sixteen years old at the 
time that they committed a crime violated the Eighth Amendment in part because of the world 
consensus on the issue and arguing that other countries’ constitutional interpretations of their 
cruelty prohibitions were irrelevant to interpreting the American constitution). 
 92.  Cf. Rudolph, 375 U.S. at 889, cert. denied, (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the United States Supreme Court should find that the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment 
in light of the trend toward abolition “throughout the world”). 
